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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORMA KOCHA,

pWw(,.ff

VS.

GIBSON PRODUCTS COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation, and MAYTEX
MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
A Texas Corporation,
Defendants,
MAYTEX MANUFACTURING COM)
PANY, A Texas Corporation,
[
Third-Party Plaintiff Appellant,
. .
vs.

13887

'

UNIVERSAL CARRIER COMPANY,
A Corporation,
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Maytex Manufacturing Company, Defendant and Third-Party PlaintiffAppellant, against Universal Carrier Company, ThirdParty Defendant-Respondent wherein the Maytex Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as Maytex,
was named as a Defendant in a personal injury action
brought by Norma Kocha for injuries allegedly suffered
1
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by that Plaintiff as a business invitee on the premises of
the Gibson Discount Center. Maytex thereafter brought
this action against the Universal Carrier Company, hereinafter referred to as Universal, for indemnity in the
event that the Plaintiff successfully recovered against
the Defendant Maytex.
, DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon the filing of Defendant Maytex's Third-Party
Complaint against Universal, Universal, by SPECIAL
APPEARANCE made a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION. The trial court with the
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, sitting as a Judge of the
Third Judicial District, granted UniversaPs Motion to
Dismiss and ruled that jurisdiction over Universal was
lacking.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Universal Carrier Company seeks an
affirmance of the Order of the District Court dismissing
the Third-Party Complaint of the Appellant Maytex, for
lack of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

•<

Respondent takes strong exception to Appellant's
Statement of Facts.
Because of the matters set forth in Point I of Respondent's Argument hereinafter, the Respondent respectfully submits that the Statement of Facts contained

2
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in Appellant's brief are without support in the record.
Appellant cites as facts in its Statement of Facts, matters
which axe purely and totally speculative and without
support in the record on appeal, or in the record available to the trial court. The only facts existence in the
record are that certain pleadings, with certain allegations, were filed with the court (though those allegations
amount to little more than hearsay); and that an Affidavit properly attested to and notarized was submitted
by David J. Moorehead, Chairman of the Board of the
Third-Party Defendant Universal Carrier Company. No
Counter-Affidavits were filed by the Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
iv
,1
Attention is drawn to Point I of Respondent's Argument for the support of prior decisions of this Honorable
Court setting the standard for the determination of what
items are to be considered facts on a motion such as
Universal^ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.
In accordance with those prior guidelines of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, the following are submitted
as the facts existing in this case:
(a) That the Plaintiff Norma Kocha filed a
Complaint in the District court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about the 4th day of April,
1974, against Gibson Products Company and the
Maytex Manufacturing Company in which it was
alleged that she, as a business invitee, was injured on
•:•>' a wire merchandise rack owned by the Defendant
Gibson and designed and manufactured by the Defendant Maytex.
;..:;.
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(b) That the Defendant Maytex filed an Answer
on or about the 10th day of June, 1974, in which it
alleged that "This defendant is a Texas Corporation,
not doing business in the State of Utah, and that
the above-entitled Court is without jurisdiction,"
and entered a general denial of the allegations of
Plaintiff's Complaint and entered other affirmative
defenses against the Plaintiff.
(c) That the Defendant Maytex Manufacturing
Company, on or about the 10th day of June, 1974,
filed a Third-Party Complaint against the ThirdParty Defendant, Universal in which it alleged:
(1) That the plaintiff had filed a complaint
against the defendant Maytex,
(2) That the wire merchandise rack in question was designed and manufactured by Universal and sold by the third-party defendant to
the third-party plaintiff,
(3) That if the plaintiff's allegations were
true, jurisdiction existed over the third-party
defendant Universal, and,
(4) That in the event that plaintiff was successful against the defendant Maytex that Universal would be liable to Maytex for the full
amount of any such judgment.
(d) That the Third-Party Defendant Universal
was served with a copy of the Complaint and with a
Summons in Texas on the 26th day of June, 1974,
by a deputy of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department

4
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•(e) That by SPECIAL APPEARANCE, the
Third-Party Defendant Universal made a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction.
- U ' .^.\;*\..*••::•>. yV.-;h
•.•--.•
(f) That the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent
Universal acting through its Chairman of the Board,
David J. Moorehead, filed an Affidavit, under oath,
and properly notarized, with the Court which set
forth the following facts: }_
:

(1) That he is the chairman of the hoard of
Universal Carrier Company which has its place
of business at 614 Easy Street, Garland, Texas.
(2) That at all times pertinent hereto, Universal Carrier Company was a Texas corporation which was not licensed to do business in
the State of Utah, and which in fact does not
sell its products to any buyers within the State
of Utah.
\
*
;
(g) That thereafter a Memorandum in Support
of Universal Carrier Company's Motion to Dismiss
was filed and an argument thereon was held on the
12th day of August, 1974, at the hour of 2:00 P.M.,
and that, thereafter, the Court entered an Order
dismissing the Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant Maytex's Complaint on the grounds that the court does
not have jurisdiction over the Third-Party DefendJ
ant, Universal Carrier Company.

No other facts appear in the record, and no other
facts were presented by counsel for the parties.

5
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ARGUMENT
.Appellants contend in the Statement of Facts section
of their brief, that the only issue on appeal is whether
an intermediate seller (such as a wholesaler or distributor) of a allegedly defective product causing injury in
Utah, can invoke long-arm jurisdiction over the designer
and manufaeturer from which it purchased the product
outside of the State. Respondent disagrees.
There is no evidence in this case to the effect that
the Appellant is "an intermediate seller" let alone a
"wholesaler and distributor." Beyond that there is the
issue of whether or not any evidence was presented to
support the Appellant's position in the trial court which
could have justified the trial court and finding other than
it did.
Therefore, Respondent contends that there are two
issues on appeal. First the question of what facts were
available to the trial court judge, and second, whether or
not the long-arm statute conveys jurisdiction over the
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
POINT I.
LOWER COURT HAD NO FACTS BEFORE IT
DURING CONSIDERATION OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION, OTHER THAN THIRDPARTY DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT.

As indicated previously, the only Affidavit or other
verified or attested to facts available to the court was
the Affidavit of David J. Moorehead, Chairman of the
Board of the Respondent. No affidavits, depositions,
6
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answers to interrogatories or any other such materials
were filed by the Appellant Maytex. The Appellant
Maytex is apparently relying on the allegations set forth
in its Complaint, and in the Complaint of the Plaintiff
Norma Koch a, as though they were facts. Under previous
cases of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they are not
allowed to do so.
Rule 6D and Rule 43E of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures provide for the filing of Affidavits on motions such as Universale Motion to Dismiss in this matter. Rule 56E with reference to similar affidavits, states
as follows:
'' Supporting and opposing affidavit shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as w^ould be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. . . . The
court may permit the affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affida^jjts. When a
motion for summary judgmentarici supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, a summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him."
Allegations in a Complaint or an Answer are not
evidence. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Maytex's
Third-Party Complaint in this matter is signed by the
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attorney for the Third-Party Plaintiff and it is not a
verified Complaint. The information contained therein
is at best hearsay, and it would not be admissible at time
of trial.
•
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides :
"The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he had read the pleading; that
to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it, and that
it is not interposed for delay."
An attorney does not attest that all items contained in
the Complaint, or other pleading signed by him, are true.
Indeed in nearly all instances such signings of pleadings
are based on hearsay information received from clients
or other sources.
The court has often had occasion to deal with and
discus s affidavits or other testimony-type discovery
matters where the evidence adduced by them would not
be admissible at trial. In the 1972 case of Western States
Thrift & Loan Company vs. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58,
504 P.2d 1019, the court held that an Affidavit opposing
a Motion for Summary Judgment must be made on the
personal knowledge of the affiant and set forth facts
which w^ould be admissible in evidence. The court determined that the Affidavit in question was based on hearsay and based on information and belief and that it thus
did not conform to the requirements of the Rule to
create a genuine issue of fact for trial sufficient to preclude the entry of a Summary Judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff.
8
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In the 1971 case of ASM
Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Eunsaker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700, a similar result
was held where the discovery device was Interrogatory
Answers. In that matter the court held that Interrogatory Answers which were based upon hearsay statements
and conclusions, and not based on personal actual knowledge, should not be considered in determining whether
or not there was a disputed issue of material fact.
In the 1969 case of Rainford vs. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d
252, 451 P.2d 769, the court refused to accept a Defendant's Affidavit which consisted of inadmissible parole
evidence, and on that basis granted a Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. In that case the court
stated as follows:
"The action of the trial court in the instant case
must be substained, since appellant's affidavit
consisted entirely of inadmissible parole evidence,
submitted for the purpose of varying and adding
to the terms of the written agreement of the
parties. An affidavit in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment to be effective must set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." (At Page 255.)
See also Walker vs. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation^ Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).
The Third-Party Plaintiff - Appellant apparently
feels that the mere assertion of an allegation in its ThirdParty Complaint raises that as a "fact" to be considered
in any judicial determination relating to the case. Under
the Utah case law, this is not so. This question was
squarely faced in the 1966 case of Dnpler vs. Yates, 10
9
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Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624. In that case, an action by
purchasers of interests in oil wells to recover damages
for alleged fraud and deceit and breach of fiduciary relationship, the court held that allegations in pleadings are
not sufficient to raise issues of fact. The court in the
Dupler case stated as follows:
"Certainly, if the summary judgment procedure is
to be effective, it must be held that when adequate proof is submitted in support of the motion,
the pleadings are not sufficient to raise an issue
of fact."

,

The court went on to spell out its reasons and justification for that general rule as follows:
"Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts
ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party produce some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the movent's case or specify in an
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so.

^

Where as in the instant case the materials presented by the moving party are sufficient to
entitle him to a directed verdict and the opposing
party fails either to offer counter affidavits or
other materials that raise a credible issue or to
show that he has evidence not then available,
summary judgment may be rendered for the moving party.
The record made by the defendant in support
of his motion for summary judgment, controverted the unverified allegations in the plaintiff's
amended complaint and therefore, in the absence
of counter affidavits, no genuine issues of material fact were created.''

See also 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed), at page 2067.
10
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This position has been upheld in more recent Utah
Supreme Court cases such as Montoya vs. Berthana
Investment Corporation, 21 Utah 2d 37, 439 P.2d 853
(1968); and Pioneer Finance and Thrift Company vs.
Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d 389 (1968).
,
,
Most recently in the 1973 case of Clegg vs. Lee, 30
Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, the court adhered to the rule
set out in the Dnpler case and stated on page 247 as
follows:
"A matter may be determined on summary judgment upon facts given in a party's deposition.
Under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., an adverse party
may not rely on mere allegations or denials in his
pleadings, but he must set forth the facts showing
that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact
for trial.''
As the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction was a Motion that
could be, and in fact became, dispositive of the case, it
had to be approached on much the same grounds as would
a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent filed an Affidavit, the only factual
documents so submitted in this matter, and in so doing,
contravened and cut across any and all allegations relating to jurisdiction set out by the Plaintiff or Third-Party
Plain tiff-Appellant. Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant had
opportunity to submit Counter Affidavits prior to the
hearing of the matter, or during the period the court had
the matter under advisement before decision, and they
failed to do so. Thus the only facts present in the record in this regard, are that the Third Party Def endant11
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Respondent has its principal place of business in Texas
and that it is not licensed to do business in Utah and in
fact, does not sell its products to any buyers in the
State of Utah.
Appellant Maytex's statement of facts contains the
following statement, "nor is there anything in the affidavit indicating that Universal did not purposefully
intend its products to come into the State of Utah. Nor is
there anything to indicate that the sale in question
involved an isolated transaction; for all we know from
the state of the record, the respondent may well have
thousands of its manufactured products in use in stores
throughout the State of Utah. All of these facts would
have to be considered in the light most favorable to
Maytex for the purpose of the motion to dismiss." We
contend that these items cannot be considered in a "light
most favorable to Maytex" because they are not facts.
They are the purest kind of speculation without any
evidentiary support whatever and, indeed, without even
a previously stated allegation. The Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant had an opportunity to produce Counter
Affidavits or other evidence to the effect, that they
could be obtained, and they failed to do so. There
are no allegations, supported or unsupported as to the
intent of Universal; there are no allegations, supported or unsupported, with reference to Universal^
regular business practices; there are no allegations, supported or unsupported, that Universal has any other of
its products in Utah; and there are no allegations, supported or unsupported, setting forth the Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant's version of how this item might have
come in to the State of Utah.
12
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To the respondent's knowledge there is only one case
in Utah in which it was held that allegations in a Plaintiff's Complaint stood, as facts, in opposition to averments in the Affidavits supporting a defendant's motion
thus raising a controverted issue of fact. This was in the
1963 case of Christensen vs. Financial Service Company,
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010. That case said that an
adverse party on a Motion for Summary Judgment may
serve opposing Affidavits but is not required to do so
and that his pleadings could raise issues of fact precluding Summary Judgment. However, the Christensen case
was recognized as being in opposition to the accepted and
general rule nation-wide and the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah in the 1968 case of United American Life
Insurance Company vs. Willey, 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P.2d
755, case virtually overruled the decision in the Christ ensen case.
In the United American Life Insurance Company
case the court cited the Christensen case and stated as
follows:
"When that case was decided, it placed Utah all
by itself among the States of the Nation, and
the sole associate it had in that regard was in
the Third Federal Circuit. . . . Quite aside from
having the distinction of causing Utah to be the
only Soldier in the Nation to be 'in step' the case
is now no authority for the claim made by appellants for the reason that Eule 56(e) was amended
in 1956
"
Thus, it can be seen that nearly all of the evidentiary
statements contained in appellant's brief on appeal are
totally unsubstantiated by evidence.
13
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This is true of many of the statements made inAppeldant's STATEMENT OF FACTS as well as numerous
such statements appearing in Appellant's AEGUMENT
section.
On page 9 of Appellant's brief, it states that Universal purposefully placed the rack in interstate commerce and that it was foreseeable that an injury could
result in Utah. There is no evidence, nor even an allegation, to support that statement.
i Also on page 9 of Appellant's brief, it states: "It is
undisputed that the Respondents are engaged in interstate commerce and are thus beneficiaries of the protection of the Utah State Laws." There is no evidence, nor
even an allegation, in support of that statement.
'. On pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's brief, they contend
that while both the Appellant and Respondent are Texas
corporations, their contacts with Utah are greater than
any other sister state. There is no evidence, nor even an
allegation, in support of that statement.
On page 11 of Appellant's brief, it states," The manufacture of products sold in interstate commerce such as
display racks for large merchandising stores has a substantial and continuing interest in marketing its products
beyond the boundaries of the state where the manufacturing took place." There is no evidence, nor even an
allegation, that that situation would apply to the Respondent Universal.
,.,,>

14
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On page 12 of Appellant's brief on appeal, it states
that I niversal's product found its way into Utah in a
'•natural, foreseeable and purposeful manner." There is
no evidence, nor even allegation, m >uppur;. t»l* :hat staU?
iilent either.
The trial court i n this matter had no evidencr <• -M.kind eluded to and referred to in Appellant's brief, flic
evidence and the record reflects no such facts. The trial
court had only one evidentiary document. That ua>
i ! i . Al<»uj"lir;i.r Affidavit. As such. 'M«- 'r-ai j-imrt md
no alternative, •. ;";:- :]•« \<i - • *nadt ;. v :.i!..!-- :.. - . u;|i<*r
t h a n 4 : •!' -- .;.\'M .i;' ;l" "i i :i t dl , ;(- ;\ i ^H-n i;:nt ' 'versa I and to decide that jurisdiction <IM P<4 IK> MI
matter. Eespondent herein submits that iIn* situation
has not changed since it was so reviewed by ilw M-ial
court, and that, with the information available :.. it, tlie
Suprenx * ^.- ^: - ii-rt ui:l< ) = •• <:ih r.;ui:\ - !ml !<>
affirm • •:•• • if--?-,i-ti - - • M • '- : ••••.n '

POINT
THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 27 TITLE 78
U.C.A. (LONG-ARM STATUTE) DO NOT GIVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT TO THE DISTRICT COI JRT.

U n i v e r ^ f .i Mi;.; * -1 * -. - - B
:!iis regard took the
:
position tliMi - .:- Utah long-arm statute, 78-27-24, TT.C.A.
(1953) as amended in I9(i9, did not apply as an application that would include this service over Universal would
not come wiuiin tin* guidelines of the F t ah Supreme
Court case setting out the requirement !..» 'inin.inal
contacts" and
•.<-,•.-.>
<
I . -..-;« i'•< \ mh
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State Legislature placed a limit on the boundaries of the
long-arm statute by citing the due process clause directly.
Respondent agrees with the statement in Appellant's
brief that the long-arm statute was intended to "serve
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause. . . ."
However, the respondent contends that the Utah cases on
the matter have determined the boundaries of this application.
The question then is two-fold: First did the action
of Universal constitute the sufficient "minimal contact"
to hold this court's jurisdiction as constitutional and
within the express scope of the Utah Long-Arm Statute;
and Second, does the wire rack allegedly manufactured
by Universal after passing through intermediate hands
and subsequently finding its way to Utah, create such
a situation as to be included in those enumerated acts
which subject a non-resident to the jurisdiction of this
state's courts?
If the only facts accepted in this action are the facts
sot forth in Respondent's Statement of Facts, in accordance with Point I of Respondent's argument herein, there
could be no question but that those requirements are not
satisfied, and that jurisdiction over this defendant does
not lie. That would be so because the only facts in evidence are that Universal is a Texas corporation, not
doing business in Utah.
However, even if we were to consider the actual
allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint and of Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint in this matter, there
16
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would still not be a justification I'm- holding thai in*State Courts have jurisdiction ov*»r 1h<* Respondent.
Hypothetically, if we accept il"- allegations of T V n l
Party Plaintiff Maytex's ' v : >hii)it. and m tin- t-xtcnt
that they are applicable the allegations of plaintiff
Kocha's Complaint, the most extensive contontinns we
would have would *•« ••-- follows:
1. That a wire merchandise >-.\
tiff in Murrav, l T tah.
2. That Universal
facture! the IT.-K.

<i\

: tin-

-la;. t**\) designed arid manu-

3. That Universal sold the rack to Maytex.
(There are no allegations relating to how the rack came
into Utah, or where the rack was sold by Universal to
Maytex, or \h:r Universal intended that tin- rack rome
into Utah,
.-.: Universal is engaged \u luiervratr
commerce, or that uu\ *A\.i-v <>r -he products manufactured by Universal are existent in the State of Utah.)
Even if such items as are alleged in the above-referenced
Complaints were admitted, they would still not meet the
requirements of due process set out by the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court v ! die State of
Utah.
The United States Supreme Court in iiti>-tnational
Shoe Company vs. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
66 S.Ct. 154, (1945) set the standard as to what n,nnections the non-resident must have u«:!i Mn- forum
state before that state can exercise jurisdiction over the
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non-resident via its state courts. The court held that the
due process clause required that the non-resident have
certain minimal contacts with the forum state. The court
said:
". . . due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimal contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
The corporation in International Shoe seeking to defeat
jurisdiction was a show manufacturing company and the
court found jurisdiction based on the activities of the
corporation in Washington State and accordingly its
activities differ greatly from our situation, for in that
case, International Shoe had salesmen in the State and
such activities were regular and continuous, thus making
the corporation amenable to process. In our situation,
there are no salesmen, warehouses, outlets, manufacturing or other activities which create any contact with the
State of Utah. The only factor is that a wire rack ended
up in Utah, not at the direction of the Universal, and it
had passed through independent hands. Such a remote
and isolated incident could not be construed as systematic
and continuous so as to make Universal Carrier Company
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts.
The Court stated, in International Shoe, supra, with
respect, to irregular and casual contact:
". . . it has been generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate agent or of activi18
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ties in a state in the corporation's behalf are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action
unconnected with the activities there."
r

i
*kTo require the corporation in such circumstances
to defend the suit away from its home or other
jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial
activities has been thought to lay too great and
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process."

The mere fact that a vv ire rack happened to m a up in
Utah does not constitute systematic and continuous operating within the State ;.:i.- - - : *. .ninimai ,<uiitaHs"
requirement i- ••* - :
•< r •'•ilional Shoe.
p
r
h o l d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n \< ;;n exceed t!" ' m d - "f :a«p r o c e s s a m i w ^ M • ••.•r:;jm v nffVnd :'.. •••>!!: a o:' f-nr
p l a y Mini M I ! - !;;>•;.;.! j u s t i c e . "
'!''.« • ' / l i S u p r e m e <'( ; : n i i;t? < ; i j t •.• <>n t h e scope a n d
exten;

H " ><•• ] .mu

.\\i:-<

Stalui<\

a : •: ;'

f a s s t a t e d it>

p o s i t '-.«•. • *, •*•: • <;-ra- i n ] ; - .

In G'emw. ys. If hit mo re, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d
871 (1959), a suit to enforce an Illinois judgment against
a Utah resident, im- i -uii i *t«*;iis with 111*• (jiu->1 imj <>f w hat
constituted ?. transacts - ^ business";.- it n-iaio t<i
due process. ! court found that the actions of the Utah
resident as they related to Illinois did not constitute the
"transaction of business" and, therefore, subjecting the
Utah resident to Illinois service of process and jurisdiction did not conform with due process requirements. The
actions of the Utah resident were conducted In mail and
1 A
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were a response to a solicitation via the mails from an
Illinois resident to purchase a horse. The court found
that these actions, including the inspection of the horse
by a friend of the defendant in Illinois, did not constitute
sufficient contact so as to invoke jurisdiction under the
Illinois Long Arm Statute.
Admittedly, in the Conn, case, the court was not
construing the Utah statute. However, they were discussing the due process requirements involved in personam
jurisdiction. This case set the stage for the case of Hill
vs-, Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332, which
followed in 1971.
In the case of Hill vs. Zale Corporation, the
Utah Supreme Court directly dealt with and examined
Utah's Long Arm Statute. That case also involved a
Texas corporation. In that case the plaintiff filed an
action against the defendant seeking to recover for
wages, an incentive award, vacation pay and moving
expenses, totalling about $2,500 which he claimed were
due for services rendered to the defendant in Anchorage,
Alaska. In that case the defendant corporation brought
an action to dismiss on the grounds that there had been
no proper service of summons and upon a lack of jurisdiction. The trial court, the Honorable Gordon B. Hall
presiding, dismissed the action stating:
"That the defendant is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Texas and is not subject to service of process
within the State of Utah."

20
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The Supreme ( oint agreed with iht- triai rutin >
view of the law but, in a review of the facts surrounding
the defendant's motion, ruled that the legal requirements
were satisfied by the facts as shown in affidavits. Nonetheless, tl
.;rt stated iii*- \ -de - Mmg forth the requirements Of •* ;• '•<• *-• "i • r "ll -•* '- :
\< i> appreciated that iiu language jii^i quoted
necessarily a broad sounding generality; and
: : I:JI it must be so interpreted and applied as to
conform with basic concepts of fairness and due
process of law. This mandates //•"' l fnn-i*iu
corporation should not be subjected to undue difficulties from lawsuits merely because its products are distributed in this state or may be pur
chased and sold by others herein."
(Emphasis
added).
i

{
Later, h
- \\*1. .;.
7ifdt-^a lh <">>. r<>wlnm
vs. Louie's Boats and Motors, u7 1 "ta.li 2d 233, 494 I* :Jd
532, the Supreme Court held that a defendant corporation wThich allegedly committed a conversation of a domestic corporation's property in Oregon was not subject
to suit under Utah's Long Arm Statute. In that case the
Court recognized i;n* dm- p i - v ^ ••*<;:•• t-i, <-n!> <.i Itdtf
national Shoe vs. Washington, suj,n\ .M < ;..-; ! ilm! in
tl;i- ti.rl aelinri r'.-.i \•.••• r nnt significant cu;it:ii-i> in
impose jurisdiction even under Utah's broadly worded
Long Arm Statute. The specific section of Utah's Long
Arm Statute which was used to support the plaintiff's
contention that jurisdiction did lie in Utah was the precise seethe .;,;;;;; which W-A ".ii'nd \\iw\\ \,in:t\\i\\. Maytex
Manufacturing, seeks to asset? I'irisdietii.ii against the
third-party defendant, Universal Carn< i < .innanv. Thit
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section is Section 78-27-24 (3), Utah Code Annotated,
1953. More specifically, the court recognized the basis of
the claim as involving the portions of 78-27-24 relating to

torts.
In the Hydro swift case, the courts stated the law as
follows:
We disagree with the urgence of plaintiff, are
'
< unwilling to extend that case, which appears to
- " •-•••' have inspired our Long Arm Statute, and believe
and hold that under the circumstances related
hereinabove the plaintiff legitimately cannot claim
jurisdiction that might sanction this litigation in
Utah.

,.

Under 78-27-22, it is stated that the provisions of
the act apply 'to the fullest extent permitted by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .' We believe that the same amendment
would protect one from being subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, where he allegedly committed a tort such as claimed here, or a
slander or the like in a sister state, but not in
Utah, on grounds of denial of due process of law.

In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court, in a decision by
Justice Henriod, synopsized the relationship between the
International Shoe case and the Hill vs. Zalr Corporation
case in the case of Foreign Study League vs. HollandAmerica Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244. In that case
though jurisdiction was found, the court made a number
of significant statements. That case stressed the proposition that cases such as these are "strictly factual and
dispositive by the application of case and statutory law
to the fact situation presented in the instant case. . . . "
It is therefore, very important and very significant that
22
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facts be carefully presented and considered and that the
evidentiary requirements to establish facts be followed.
Unlike the evidence presented in the Foreign
Study
1
League case , there is no evidence in this action h\ M;:yn-\
which '<-;:; : .
<•,..-;•; <.«.*:•;:• * uiversal sent
e m p l o ; . • •<•-

i * * i liJ-

' I : ! ! : ! M - - : - • !• -

c h i i l ; ; t i - ! > !"4ii - u i f::tt \x, «•

'< i ; - - r - . . r

11 \ * n A' v *• a ? » if* .-«--«^

;

\pjx-'

lant's extrapolations out of the air, Maytex contends
that they bought tlu- nr-firV in Texas and -hipped it W»to
Utah themselvrAj-i-ii;.-.'
( *

ii .

J

•1 . • - . . . . -

'••*!* ignores .A' .-;' . •
.i

' ;

•

M l *

i

'••.;•

' '•

(

:

.:i* ^ l i p r ^ ^ -

-\r.--it J'-ll

n'f

! 'MI

case of Pellegrini vs. Sachs & s<>h. I iah 2d, 522 P.2d MM
(1974), Vppellant attempts to distinguish the Foreign
Study League case and the Hill case on the basis that
they construe a different subsection of the long-arm
statute. Though this is perhaps the case, they certainly
have language in them wl substantial import which i>
addressed H- U' i..,-•„: -ITM statute i\> a w huh Tin- \ p . - l
h\u\ :*!i(t!;t-( .-u« ii]'i:- i<r distinguisli tin* Hydro swift Cor;».i"int., r;i>«* -;: the ground the tortious activity did not
take place in Ttah. However, it could certainly be considered that the h'j! : : \ suffered by the Plaintiff took
place HI I tah. in tin- instant case, Maytex apparently
sent the assembled rack int..- I hf i. v l;u miy activity
engaged in In I m\ ersal, took ;.;,':•••<- ::- MK Sint« o\ rIV\:is.
As indicated above, the Appellants have placed some
reliance in their brief on the Pellegrini case. The Pellegrini case contains the following; language:
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"It is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus envoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."
The court then went on to recognize a distinction between
a dealer and a manufacturer who participates "in sending
their wares into foreign states.'' There is no evidence,
nor is there any allegation, that Universal sent its products anywhere outside of Texas. The Chairman of the
Board of Universal attests that they do not sell to any
buyers within the State of Utah. Apparently the Maytex
Manufacturing Company manufactures and assembles
products it purchases. It is apparently the Maytex Manufacturing Company which sends their wares into foreign
states.
CONCLUSION
The Universal Carrier Company submits that the
facts in this matter must be construed as set forth in
David J. Moorehead's Affidavit as no other facts are
before the court. The facts set forth in that Affidavit
contradict the allegations of jurisdiction which appear in
Plaintiff's Complaint. As such, the trial court had no
alternatives but to rule in favor of the Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent.
Further, even if the facts were assumed to be as
alleged in Plaintiff's Comi)laint and in Third-Party
Plaintiff's Complaint, that would still not extend juris-

24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

diction over the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent as
those allegations are limited in scope and do not g<> to
the ultimate questions wliich concern jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Respondent respectfully requests that
the court affirm the J udgmc nt ••••*' *Vr n-i/.l "«im-t.
OATMDlhiK NHidav of Aiaru
TIMDALTON DUNN
Attorney of Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent
Universal Carrier Company
702 Kearns Building
Salt T - I - riiv r i a h V-LH,
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